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Speculative Behavior of Institutional Investors
ABSTRACT
A survey compared speculative behavior in twogroups of institutional
investors. The 'experimental' group held stocks that had shownextraordinary
price increases over the preceding year that also had high priceearnings
ratios. The control group held randomly selected stocks. In Shiller and
Pound [1986] we argued that the survey resultsgave some support to some
diffusion or epidemic models for interest in the stocks in theexperimental
group. Here, we show that the two groups are similar in describing their
investment strategy as relating to a theory about fundamental valuerather
than about the kind of stocks that are becoming attractiveto investors.
However, the experimental group is less likely to make explicitcomparisons
of price with measures of fundamental value, and differs from thecontrol
group in their attitudes toward timing, price changes, and short-term
earnings disappointment. Overall, these results appear consistent with the
notion that price changes unrelated to fundamentalsmay be caused by
contagious enthusiasm about fundamentals amongst institutional investors.
The holding patterns of those experimentalgroup investors who said that
they were unsystematic in their stock choice are studied. These investors
tended to show gradually increasing holdings over theperiod of stock price
increase. Reasons respondents gave for the gradual increaseare discussed.
John Pound
Office of the Chief Economist
Securities and Exchange Commission
Room 6023, Stop 6-3







Box 2125 Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520Introduction
We have undertaken a broad-based survey of institutional investors to
learn about the their habits of behavior, interpersonal communications, and
the nature of their theories. In a companionpaper (Shiller and Pound
[1986]) some results of the survey were used to evaluate a model of
interpersonal communications that was patterned after contagion models used
by epidemiologists. In this paper other results of the survey are described
that help us learn whether institutional investors in some stocks fit models
of speculative behavior that could mean that they (and notjust individual
investors) give rise to price movements unrelated to objective fundamentals.
Here, we also look at patterns of holdings of those institutional investors
whose behavior seems particularly relevant to such presumed speculative
"bubbles".
The idea that prices of speculative assets might move for reasonshaving
to do more with the speculative behavior of investors than with information
about true fundamentals has generally been out of favor ever since the
literature on market efficiency became widely known. More recently, however,
a lot of 'anomalous evidence' regarding the efficient markets hypothesis has
appeared and the widespread conclusion that markets are efficient has been
questioned (see, for example, Shiller [1984], or Summers [1986] for a
discussion). One of us (Shiller [1984]) has proposed an alternative model of
prices of speculative assets which admits the existence of some "smart
money" that attenuate the effects of the more ordinary investors on price
but do not eliminate the effects. In this model price is equal to the
3present value of expected future dividends plus a term proportional to the
present value of the expected (by smart money) demands of ordinary
investors. Such a model might well accommodate most of the evidence on
market efficiency while at the same time allowing also purely speculative
price movements, i. e., price movements generated by investors speculative
behavior rather than by any information about fundamental value. Analogous
models have been proposed by Kyle [1986], and Singleton [1985]. A number of
papers in the "noisy rational expectations" models literature also imply
that the effect of ordinary investors on price is not eliminated by smart
money (e. g., Hellwig [1980], Admati [1985]). The arbitrage pricing theory
(Ross [1976]) is consistent with such an effect if the speculative price
movements in individual stocks contribute towards a factor structure for all
returns.
A great deal of attention has recently been paid the fact that stocks
with high price-earnings ratios and stocks whose price has increased
dramatically tend to show subsequent negative abnormal returns. (See for
example Basu [1983] and DeBondt and Thaler [1985].) One popular
interpretation for these results is that such stocks are often undergoing
purely speculative price runups whose probable end brings subsequent price
declines. We thus sought to study such stocks to see if we could find
evidence that might show a speculative component to institutional investors'
behavior.
The ten stocks used for the experimental1 group were chosen to show, in
1We use the term 'experimental' to denote the group of investors that
we wish to compare with randomly selected investors. This use of the term
corresponds to the common usage in analysis of variance, even though here no
controlled experiment was undertaken.
4May or June of 1985, extremely high price increase in the precedingyear and
a high P/E ratio. Of course, we do not know withany certainty whether any
of the ten stocks that we selected were actuallyoverpriced. At the very
least, however, the experimental group stocks are stocks that are
'interesting' and may incite extensive interpersonal communications, andmay
be also be grouped in some other dimensions with the stocks thatcould be
predicted to show negative abnormal returns. The experimentalgroup of
investors consisted of 125 institutional investors in these ten stocks.The
control group of investors consisted of 95 institutional investors inten
companies chosen at random from the universe of publicly held corporations.
These investors should be representative of the marketas a whole. Names of
institutional investors were taken from those who indicated,on the 13f
report to the Securities Exchange Commission, that they held stock in one
of the companies on March 31 or June 30, 1985.2
Questionnaires that used the company name throughout for each of the 20
stocks. Complete individualization of questionnaires (rather thanindividu-
alization of letters only asking that the questionnaire be filledout with
the stock in mind) was done to assure that answers relatedto the actual
stocks and were not interpreted as answers to hypotheticalquestions.
Responses were obtained for nine stocks in the experimentalgroup, and six
in the control group. For these stocks, severalsummary statistical
differences are shown in Table 1. As can beseen, not only were price
increases and P/E ratios more dramatic in thegroup, but other differences
2lnstitutional investors withdiscretion over accounts with combined
equity assets exceeding $100 million must report on Form l3f their equity
holdings at the end of each quarter. Equity holdings below 10,000 shares and
also below $200,000 in market value need not be reported,although such
holdings often are reported anyway.
5that we did xselecton are also evocative of stocks going through a
public fad. Turnover rates were higher for the experimental group stocks.
Consensus forecasts of fiscal 1985 earnings increased more in the
experimental group than in the control group, but the increase came nowhere
near the increase in prices. The increase in the consensus forecast for
fiscal 1985 relates to expectations for the firms over a short horizon (for
which information is likely to be relatively concrete), in contrast to the
increase in price which presumably reflects expectations for the firm over
the indefinite future.
We followed a rigorous regimen (following Dilinian's [1978] "Total Design
Method") in order to maximize accuracy of sampling and the response rate
from our sample of investing institutions. Each institution was initially
contacted and asked to forward a questionnaire to an individual within the
organization who was responsible for the decision to purchase stock in the
corporation in question. The letter strongly emphasized that the
questionnaire should be filled out only by the actual decision maker. Three
follow-up letters were then sent, two of which included an extra
questionnaire, the final letter delivered by registered mail. All
emphasized the individual survey response would be treated confidentially,
and that the survey results would be published, so that their efforts had
the potential to result in significant advancement of public knowledge about
the stock market.
We received cooperative responses from 128 or 59% of the 216 institutions
surveyed. We felt this was a very high response rate given the pitfalls
involved in asking institutions to obtain the cooperation of the relevant
decision maker. Of these, 57 institutions indicated that they were out of
6frame (usually, that the decision to purchase was not made by someone
presently in the institution or that the decision was forced by a mechanical
rule, as with index funds). We received usable questionnaires from 41
experimental group institutions, and 30 control group respondents.3
We concluded, in the other paper discussing some results of thissurvey
(Shiller and Pound [1986]), that the evidence supported the notion that
contagion models are particularly useful in understanding the investors'
behavior in our experimental group. Contagion models have been used by
epidemiologists to study the transmission of diseases (e. g., Bailey [1975])
or social psychologists and sociologists to study the transmission of
fashions or fads (e. g., Bartholomew [l982]). If, as a simplecontagion
model suggests, interest in fad stocks is spread primarily by personal
communication among investors, then this should be evident in two aspects of
fad investors' communication patterns in our experimentalgroup. First,
these investors should become interested in the stocks in questionprimarily
because of personal communications with other investors. Second, these
investors should be active in communicating with others, therebyspreading
the word about the stock. We interpreted our results as in concordance these
inferences even for our control group, and, moreover, supporting these
inferences more for those investors in the experimentalgroup.
Fundamentals versus Market Psychology
For the purpose of learning whether traditional bubble or fads models
3Further details about thesampling procedure, implementation method
are in Shiller and Pound [1986].
4Social psychologists have shown thatdirect interpersonal
communications among peers is of singular importance for attitude change
(McCuire [1969]).
7might in some sense be descriptive of the behavior of investors in our
experimental group, we first approached the issue in a very direct way. We
posed an open-ended question, asking investors to state briefly the theory
that motivated them to invest in the stock in question:5
In a few words, state the theory that caused you to purchase
___________Putthe theory as you would have put it to convince a
trusted friend or fellow investment professional to buy the stock.
Immediately after the space in which they were to write the theory, the
following questions appeared:
Which of the following better describes the above theory? (circle one
number)
A theory about the kinds of stocks that are becoming
attractive to investors
experimental group: 25% (ci 7%)
control group: 21% (a =8%)
A theory about fundamentals, such as profits or dividends
experimental group: 75% (ci =7%)
control group: 79% (ci = 8%)
n:40,28
There is virtually no difference between the experimental and control
groups on their classification of their theories: they both tend strongly to
51n what follows, the percent of those answering the question who chose
the indicated answer are shown for the experimental and control groups.
Since some respondents did not answer all questions, the number answering
the question are also shown for the experimental and control groups.
Standard errors, designated a, are computed by the formula a =
wherex is the number selecting the answer.
8describe their theories as concerning fundamentals.6 The theoriesprovided,
in both control and experimental groups, seemed also to referto judgments
about public information about fundamentals, suchthings as growth trends in
the industry and quality of management] For both experimental andcontrol
groups, there was no explicit mention in the open-ended question of market
psychology. No investor in either the control or experimentalgroup of
stocks explicitly stated that the stock in questionmight be overpriced.
Of course, buying an overpriced stock would seemunlikely unless there is a
theory that market psychology would result in its becoming even more
overpriced, and we have seen that no mention of market psychology wasever
made.
We interpret these results as rather unfavorable (at least for these
institutional investors) to the sort of traditional bubble model inwhich
investors perceive themselves as participating in a bubble andhope to exit
before it is over. The answers to the open-endedquestion, however, are not
inconsistent with the notion that 'fads'among institutional investors about
theories of fundamental value might engender speculative bubbles.
Within the framework of fundamental analysis used by both investor
groups, there was in fact a significant difference between control and
experimental investors' theories. The difference lay in their concern with
relative valuation. Among control investors, 60% mentioned the relative
value of their stock in describing their investment theory -- comparingits
6
Of course, choosing the second answer to the abovequestion does
not rule out that the respondent was counting on an inappropriate market
response to fundamentals. Margin comments indicated that some respondents
had trouble answering this question
Except for unspecific references to discussions with management, none
referred to distinct inside information.
9price, at the time they invested, to some measure of fundamental value.8
Most common were mentions of low P/E rations, low price relative to asset
(or book) value, and low price relative to cash flow. A majority of control
group investors thus explicitly stated that they considered the stock a good
value at the time of investment -- with44% explicitly suggesting that it
was undervalued at the time.
By contrast, only 12% of our 41 experimental respondents compared the
price of the stock to either current or future fundamental value.9 Instead,
their answers focussed almost exclusively on the near-term future earnings
and growth prospects for the industry in question. Of the 41 experimental
group investors, 80% mentioned the prospect for strong, apparently
short-term, growth as the major motivation to invest. Earnings projections
were virtually never compared to price but rather mentioned as something
desirable in their own right. The group thus appeared caught up in growth
potential, and far less concerned with whether this potential was already
reflected in the stock's current market price.
Almost all of the experimental group investors described their theory in
the classic lines of the good "story" stock. The industry in question had
8Perhaps this concern with undervaluation reflects some concern
with market psychology, not explicitly stated.
9Such comparisons with fundamental value need not have involved
complicated calculations. While price was very high relative to the
immediately available earnings figure, there are potentially many other
things that one might expect professional investors to compare with price.
For example, they might cite the per-share values of the appraised value of
the assets, of public earnings forecasts, or of size of plausible market
share. We cannot rule out the possibility that they had such comparisons in
mind and did not see fit to write them in the four-lines space provided.
Still, if such calculations were really on their mind one would think that
the calculations would be cited more often in efforts to convince a "fellow
investment professional to buy the stock."
10undergone an important shift in prospects. This shift was tied to a fairly
vivid recent qualitative changes that have been widely analyzed in the
popular press. Prominent among the investors' "theories" mentioned were
trends that any follower of general corporate news would be familiar with;
including the shift in medical care to health maintenance organizations, the
shift to generic drugs, and the growing industrial waste problem. Thus,
experimental group investors' theories did not seem particularly subtle or
unusually insightful, as would be suggested if the investment were driven by
comparisons of price with specialized knowledge about the company.
Market Timing
The traditional bubble model might seem to suggest that investors are
very concerned with the timing of their investments. If fundamentals do not
justify the price increases, then investors are perhaps likely to feel that
the profit opportunity is short-lived. We asked:
Do you remember thinking at any time that the potential for profiting




experimental group: 30% (a —7%)
control group: 17% (a —7%)
No 2
experimental group: 70% (a —7%)
control group: 83% (a —7%)
n:40,30
The experimental group does have somewhat more investors who feel that the
profit opportunity is short-lived. We thought that such a result might be
suggest that concerns with what other investors are thinking in the short
run is much more on the mind of the experimental group investors. But,
11admittedly, the outcome of this question could have other interpretations.
It's possible, for example, that the greater concern with timing is just due
to the observed rapidity of price movements.
Hypothetical Questions
We posed several hypothetical questions concerning the stocks under
study:
In each of the following questions, what is your best guess as to how
you would change your holdings of __________commonstock?
I would I would do I would
buy more nothing sell
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER FOR EACH ITEM]
a. Price of the stock increases
by 25% over the next year 1 2 3
experimental group 16% (o—6%) 46% (o—8%) 38% (a—8%)
control group 4% (a—4%) 36% (o—9) 61% (a—9%)
n: 37, 28
b. Price of the stock decreases
by 2. over the next year 1 2 3
experimental group 47% (a—9%) 38% (a—8%) 15% (o—6%)
control group 50% (a—9%) 43% (a—9%) 7% (a—5%)
n:34,28
C.Abroker, or other investment
professional calls and
recommends that you sell 1 2 3
experimental group 0% 92% (c—4%)8% (a—4%)
control group 0% 100% 0%
n:40,30
d. Bad news about current or near-
term corporate performance
appears in the Wall Street Journal
(e.g., poor earnings, worsening
competitive position, etc.) 1 2 3
experimental group 5% (a—3%)40% (a—8%) 55% (cS%)
control group 21% (o—8%)57% (a—9%) 21% (a8%)
n:40,28
e. The company announces a cut
in dividends 1 2 3
experimental group 0% (ax%)41% (i=8%) 59% (ci8%)
12control group 4% (o-—4%)52% (a—lO%) 44% (i'lO%)
n: 34,27
Answers to part "a" show that control group investors are morelikely
than experimental group investors to sell if the price risessubstantially.
This suggest perhaps that control group investors more often have in minda
notion of fundamental value, and tend more to be looking forbargains in
stocks. Moreover, the experimental group investors are morelikely to buy
more if there is a price rise, as suggested by traditional bubble models.
Still, only 16% would buy more, which suggests against the importance of the
notion that experimental group investors are well-described in terms ofa
traditional bubble story in which price increases generate increased demand
and thus further price increases, in a vicious circle. There isessentially
no difference between the groups in their reaction to a price decline,part
Answers to part "d" show a difference between the groups' reactions toa
short-term disappointment in fundamental performance. Amajority of the
experimental group investors say they would sell their holdings given such
news, compared to only a fifth of the control investors. This result is
consistent with the heavy emphasis experimental investorsgave to near-term
earnings performance in describing their investing theory.
Part ttb shows essentially no difference between thegroups, but it is
noteworthy that essentially half of both groups would buy more if price fell
25%. Certainly this result Is not consistent with traditional bubbletheory
in which a price decrease would signal the collapse of the bubble.
Price Changes and Investor Interest
One possible view of investment professionals is that they mightspend
13their time estimating "intrinsic values" for a large number of stocks, and
then automatically buy stocks whenever price falls below intrinsic value.
Interest in particular stocks would then be spurred by price declines (as
well as by reevaluations of intrinsic values). This may well be true of most
of the investors in the control group:
Did a significant change in the price of stock motivate your initial
interest in a way that led to your purchase of this stock?
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER]
v.. 1
experimentalgroup: 30% (a —7%)
control group: 50% (a —9%)
No 2
experimental group: 70% (a —7%)
control group: 50% (a —9%)
n:41, 30
If Yes, what was the direction of the change?
Up 1
experimental group: 33% (a —14%)
control group: 0%
Down 2
experimental group: 67% (a —14%)
control group: 100%
n:12,15
An opposite view of investor reaction to price changes that is often
espoused is that investor interest in individual stocks is spurred by price
increases. As noted above, traditional bubble models say that people
extrapolate past price increases, thinking that the trend will continue.
Some of the experimental group said they were attracted by a price
14increase, though most did not.
Investor Motivation
Related to the conventional notion of speculative bubbles is the notion that
participants in the bubble are motivated by the hopes of great profits. This
would imply that the experimental group investors would be more likely to be
seeking an unusual profit opportunity. The answers to the following question
confirm this presumption, but in fact most investors in bothgroups describe
themselves as seeking such opportunities:
Which of the following statements better describes howyour current
portfolio (or the portfolios you manage) was put together?
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER]
The primary motivation for purchasing each stock wasmy
expectation of an unusual profit opportunity in that stock
at the time of purchase.
1
experimental group: 95% (a3%)
control group: 77% (a8%)
The primary motivation for purchasing each stock was to
balance the portfolio, that is, to keep certain kinds of
stocks as a certain proportion of the portfolio.
2
experimental group: 5% (a =3%)
control group: 23% (a =8%)
n: 30.40
Diffusion Investors and Systematic Investors
Decision makers in the experimental group of stocks tend to describe
their approach to stock-picking differently than do investors in other
stocks. We asked the decision makers surveyed whether they agreed with the
15statement: "My initial interest was the result of my, or someone else's,
systematic search over a large number of stocks (using a computerized or
other similar search procedure) for a stock with certain characteristics."
The differences in response to this question were striking. Among
control-group investors, 67% answered yes. By contrast, in the experimental
group only 25% answered yes. We took these results to be quite important
(Shiller and Pound [1986]). Diffusion or contagion models of stock price
behavior are based on unsystematic investor behavior, and indeed the great
majority in our experimental group appear unsystematic. Even if the wording
of the question leaves some doubt as to how unsystematic those who answer no
actually are, it is nonetheless clear that those in the experimental group
are less systematic than those in the control group. Note that the question
does not specify what the investors were systematic about. For what follows,
we shall divide the investors in our sample into two groups: 'diffusion
investors' are those who answered no to the above question, denying that
they were systematic. 'Systematic investors' are those who answered yes.
Diffusion Investors Tended to Increase Holdings During Period of
Rapidly Rising Prices
Figure 1 shows the number of shares (adjusted for splits and
distributions) held by each of the diffusion traders in the experimental
group as a function oftime.1° These are end-of-quarter data for each
quarter from June 1984 to September 1985. Since the stocks used in the
experimental group were selected to have very high price increases over the
101t should be noted that figures shown are for the institution and do
not necessarily reflect primarily the decision maker who filled out the
questionnaire.
16year ending May or June 1985, the time period in the plots (except for the
last observation) may be characterized as having an'uptrend' in price.
It is striking that over this period of price increase diffusion
investors tended to increase their holdings. Many of these investorsshowed
a gradual increase in holdings over the period of price increase, butonly
one showed a gradual decrease. It should be emphasized that whatare
plotted are numbers of shares and not value of holdings. Since therewere no
new issues by any of the firms, the remainder of investors, notamong the
diffusion investors in our sample, must have tended to decrease their
holdings over the sample period.
One possible interpretation that is consistent with thisfinding is that
diffusion investors are overly enthusiastic and faddish, that other
investors tend to offset the effect of their enthusiasmon price, but do not
offset their effect enough to prevent a dramaticprice increase.
The Steady Growth and Sudden CollaDse' Pattern ofHoldings
As is evident from Figure 1, the number of shares heldthrough time for
each of the 30 diffusion investors in the experimentalgroup tended to grow
zradually through the sample period, over which pricesper share were
generally rising dramatically.12 This steady growth generally either
110fcourse, since our sample consisted of investors who held the stock
near the end of the sample period plotted, those investors who
systematically decreased their holdings to zero by this date do notappear
in the plots. However, it is not clear thatany important bias is introduced
by this sampling method. Suppose that the holdings of shares are for each
investor a random walk truncated at zero and at anupper barrier. Then those
in the sample are as likely to have a higher quantity ofholdings at the
beginning of the sample as a lower.
12 .Sincethe stocks for the experimental group were selected fromamong
the highest performing stocks for the year ending June 1985(corresponding
to the second to the last point plotted in Figure 1) the prevailingpattern
of price was dramatically upwards.
17continued unabated throughout the times observed or suddenly collapsed.
All of the 30 investors increased their holdings at some point in the
sample shown in Figure 1, yet only 7 (or 23%) made an abrupt (that is,
within three months) increase in their holdings from essentially nothing to
the maximum holdings. On the other hand, of the 15 investors whose holdings
decreased at some point in the sample shown in Figure 1, 11 (Or 73%)
decreased their holdings abruptly (that is, within three months) from
essentially their maximum holdings to essentially zero. There is thus a
distinct asymmetry between increases and decreases in holdings patterns.
In only two cases was there an abrupt in-and-out pattern of holding.
There was no highly irregular pattern of holdings, in which a firm came in
and out of the stock more than once in the sample period, as might be
suggested by models in which firms were comparing the price with their own
specific information as it evolved.13
The smoothness of the increase in holdings might possibly be
attributed to the fear on the part of investors that buying large blocks of
stocks might push up the price of the stock. But there are several reasons
why this explanation is unconvincing. First, our diffusion investors are not
afraid to sell abruptly, only to buy. Second, total institutional holdings
in our sample are small, with none exceeding the 5% threshold requiring SEC
disclosure. Third, the literature on block trades -- definedas more than
10,000 shares transacted at once, as a secondary distribution -- documents
13The absence of monotonically decliningpatterns of holdings among the
diffusion investors in the experimental group is striking. Of course, our
sampling procedure assured that all those included would hold shares on
either March or June 1985, and so there are none who had sold out by those
dates. Still, there could have been monotonically declining patterns in
figure 1, and their absence is probably due to the behavior of diffusion
investors in a market with rapidly rising prices.
18an insignificant price effect from "market disruption", and a small (1 or
2%) price impact from "information" (Scholes [1972], Kraus and Stoll
[1972]).
A further examination of the holdings in the sample, comparing them to
trading volume, heightens the impression that market disruption is not the
reason for the pattern of slow accumulation. Taking the largest holdings
among diffusion traders in our experimental group in each of the nine
experimental stocks, as of December 31, 1984, and dividing the number of
shares traded in that stock in January 1985 yields an average ratio of .165.
With about 22 trading days in the average month, this ratio shows that the
largest positions in our sample of institutional investors amounted
approximately to three trading days worth of volume -- hardlyjustification
for six-month-long periods of increasing holdings. Further, as the
institutions showing highest holdings tended to be disproportionately large,
with disproportionately large holdings, the same ratio for most institutions
was a fraction of the above figure, often amounting to less than one day of
trading volume.
If investors' fear of influencing price is not likely to be the reason
for the smoothness of holding patterns, what iathereason? The following
question was posed to afford some impression as to the possibilities:
Which of the following help to explain why you waited as long as you
did to increase your holdings to their maximum?
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER FOR EACH]
Yes No
a. I purchased only when cash flows or other sales provided
funds for the purchase.
1 2
19experimental group: 29% (a7%) 71% (a7%)
control group: 23% (a=8%) 77% (a8%)
diffusion traders, experimental: 27% (a=lO%) 73% (a=8%)
n:41,30,30
b. I waited until I had carefully thought through purchasing
the stock. 1 2
experimental group: 49% (o=8%) 51% (a=8%)
control group: 40% (c=9%) 60% (a=9%)
diffusion traders, experimental: 53% (o-=9%) 47% (u9%)
n:4l,30,30
c. I wanted to accumulate over time, buying more if the
stock's performance confirmed my initial expectations.
1 2
experimental group: 46% (ci=8%) 54% (c8%)
control group: 47% (a=x%) 53% (cx8%)
diffusion traders, experimental: 50% (a=9%) 50% (c9%)
n:4l,30,30
d. I purchased at that time because some critical
information suggested that this was the best time to buy.
1 2
experimental group: 39% (a.'8%) 61% (a8%)
control group: 33% (a9%) 67% (a9%)
diffusion traders, experimental: 37% (a—9%) 63% (c=9%)
n:4l,30,30
e. I waited until a broker, analyst, or other expert
suggested that I buy.
1
2
experimental group: 10% (a5%) 90% (cx=5%)
control group: 3% (a=3%) 97% (c=3%)




experimental group: 29% (a7%) 71% (c=7%)
control group: 27% (a8%) 73% (o=8%)
diffusion traders, experimental: 37% (a=9%) 63% (cr=9%)
20n: 41, 30, 30
Most of those filling in an "other" for part "f" said something to the
effect that the purchase was triggered when price fell or when information
suggested that fundamental value had risen relative to price. Only three of
the 71 answering part "f" brought up concerns that might be construed as
related to their possibly influencing the price of the stock.
We see in these answers instead some confirmation that for many their
timing of purchase had its origins in their own way of thinking or
operating. They needed time to think through their purchases (part "b"). To
a lesser extent, they maintain their interest until cash flows allow them to
invest in the shares (part "a"). These answers suggest that the kind of time
lags between the time a diffusion investor hears a story about a stock and
actually invests fully in it may be thought of as due to simple delay, as
hypothesized in the simple contagion or epidemic models (Shiller and Pound
[1986]).
The most popular answer of all to the above question is part "c". They
wanted to experience good performance before investing a lot. This answer
suggests that traditional 'vicious circle' bubble models may have some
validity, not because price increases attract initial interest, but because
they reassure those who have already invested, who then increase their
demand.
Analysis
Institutional investors in our experimental group of 'fad' stocks are
different from those in our control group in a number of dimensions. They
are less likely to compare price with any measure of fundamental value, and
more likely to rest their case for a stock on a nonspecific "story" about
21short-run earnings prospects. They are somewhat more likely to think that
timing is critical, somewhat more likely to have their interest attracted by
price increases and somewhat less likely to report that they would sell the
share if the price increases substantially. They are more likely to sell
their shares if confronted with a short-term disappointment about
fundamental performance.
Institutional investors in our experimental group are not very different
from those in our control group in a number of other dimensions where
bubble models might have led us to expect differences. The two groups both
generally agree that they are investing on theories about fundamentals
rather than about market psychology. Most in the two groups agree that they
are seeking unusual profit opportunities, and not looking for a "balanced1'
portfolio. The two groups give similar explanations why most of them take a
substantial time to get around to investing in the stocks they are
interested in.
These results help us to frame a little better the nature of possible
purely speculative movements in stock prices. They suggest, for example,
some modification of the traditional story, as told by Keynes, of the role
of professionals in such price movements:14
This battle of wits to anticipate the basis of conventional valuation
a few months hence, rather than the prospective yield of an investment
over the long term of years, does not even require the gulls amongst
the public to feed the maws of the professional; --
MaynardKeynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money, pp.155-6.
22-- itcan be played by the professionals amongst themselves. Nor is it
necessary that anyone should keep this simple faith in the
conventional basis of valuation having any genuine long-term validity.
For it is, so to speak, a game of Snap, of Old Maid, of Musical
Chairs, a pastime in which he is victor who says Snap neither too soon
nor too late, who passes the Old Maid to his neighbor before the game
is over, who secures a seat for himself when the music stops.
Investors in our experimental group are not so conscious of timing and are
more concerned with fundamentals than his story might suggest. The bubbles
might better be described as involving interpersonal communications, rumors
and theories, about genuine fundamentals. The bubbles, if they indeed were
found among our experimental group, would be more in the nature of fashions
or fads concerning theories about which industries will be profitable in the
short- run.
23Table 1.
Comparison of Experimental and Control Group Stocks
Experimental Control
Price Increase (6/84-6/85) 184.5% 9.0%
Earnings-Price Ratio (6/85) .025 .056
Turnover Rate (6/85) 8.0% 4.7%
Change in Consensus Forecast of 35.6% -25.3%
Fiscal 1985 Earnings (6/84-6/85)
(IBES Earnings Forecast Data Base)
Note: All figures shown are weighted averages of figures for individual
stocks. Weights used were the number of respondents we had for each stock.
Earnings forecasts exclude several stocks: stocks for which we had three
respondents in the experimental group and two respondents in the control
group.
24Figure 1.
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Note:Each plot in the above figure corresponds to a firm represented by a
diffusion investor in the experimental group. For each plot the vertical
axis shows number of (split and distribution adjusted) shares held (as a
proportion of the maximum number held for that investor) on each of 6 dates:
June, September, and December of 1984, and March, June and September of
1985. Data are from Form 13f filings with the S. E. C., as reported in
Computer Directions Advisors, Inc., SPECTRUM III: 13f Institutional
Stockholder Survey.
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